This article examines the financing mechanisms that sustained Boko Haram and its offshoot, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), between 2000 and 2020. Based on fieldwork in northeastern Nigeria, including interviews with security operatives, detained insurgents, and affected community members, it identifies five principal revenue streams: kidnapping for ransom, extortion, donations and ideological support, criminal enterprise, and transnational jihadist assistance. The article argues that Boko Haram’s financing is best understood through the crime—terror nexus, while situating these practices within the wider economic vulnerabilities of northeastern Nigeria. Its principal contribution is to integrate what is often treated separately in the literature into a single typology grounded in interview evidence and documentary corroboration. The findings show that Boko Haram’s durability depended on the interaction of ideological commitment, criminal opportunism, and cross-border facilitation. The article concludes by outlining financial countermeasures suited to the Nigerian and Lake Chad context.
Bukola Adeyemi Oyeniyi (Tue,) studied this question.