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Evaluates observation-induced model divergence and attack cost inversion in adaptive defenses, suggesting new strategies for cybersecurity.
Learning-based adversaries and quantum-capable attackers are changing the defensive problem. Automated optimizers can adapt on live traffic at machine speed, while quantum algorithms undermine long-term reliance on classical public-key cryptography. Most defensive work still concentrates on protecting content and computation. Far less is established about the observation channel: whether exterior probes must improve an adaptive model of internal state, and whether that effort remains cheap for the attacker relative to the defender. In operational terms, that hidden state may represent service role, enforcement regime, tenant or sensitivity class, or coarse institutional identity—for example whether an endpoint presents as ordinary enterprise infrastructure, a hardened government service, or a high-value financial system. This paper proposes two operational defensive principles for that channel. Observation-Induced Model Divergence (OIMD) is the failure of adaptive optimization on exterior observables to recover the defender’s true internal state. Attack Cost Inversion (ACI) is the condition in which the attacker’s cost per unit of observational work exceeds the defender’s on wall-time and energy axes. Jointly, OIMD and ACI create an observer’s dilemma: extraction requires observation, but observation neither reveals state nor remains inexpensive. We evaluate both principles on TheBlackHole (TBH), a full-stack, zero-trust, entropy-aware information-theoretic protection system spanning network path, kernel datapath, memory plane, hypervisor protection (HTD/HLS), and real-time KLTu-integrated cryptographic execution, with the observation channel treated as a first-class control surface. In a live dual-host study, a black-box AdamW observer restricted to exterior HTTP features and trained without online labels fails to recover the true state on 11 of 12 runs across six hyperparameter cells and two seeds (40 steps each). True-state belief mass declines on most runs while confidence concentrates on a wrong class. Over the same runs, the observer incurs about 105–116× the defender’s wall time and 103–114× the defender’s package energy per unit of work (Intel RAPL Package 0), with one exterior probe paired to one AdamW update. Higher learning rates do not restore correct recovery within this horizon; they mainly accelerate confident collapse under the same inverted cost. A two-layer MLP capacity check on the most aggressive cell likewise yields zero true-state accuracy and does not remove inversion. These results show that an adaptive cryptographic target can make learning-based exterior observation both extractively sterile and economically unfavorable—sustaining uncertainty about what kind of system is being observed, not only about the bits it exchanges. OIMD and ACI are offered as measurable defensive principles for the observation channel under learning-based and post-quantum threat models. Keywords: observation-induced model divergence, attack cost inversion, observer’s dilemma, adaptive defense, AdamW, post-quantum cryptography, TheBlackHole, RAPL. Dedicated to: In memory of Prof. Myung Kyoon “Michael” CHUNG (1945-2025), who dedicated his life to bringing truth and science to our world. A graduate of Seoul National University, Washington State University (Pullman), University of Illinois, and lifelong Professor at Korea Advanced Institute of Technology (KAIST) with the Department of Mechanical Engineering.
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Jinhyuk Fred Chung (2026) studied this question.
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