Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Demonstrates fixed points in heresthetic games, indicating new structural dynamics in political systems.
This paper gives the general equilibrium characterization of the one common heresthetic game once political structure and resources are endogenous. In every finite public heresthetic game, a terminal-anchored decomposition operator exactly characterizes all subgame-perfect payoff and durability laws of that game. Possible and universal installation sets are the existential and universal projections of its unique fixed point, whereas security against a fixed hostile coalition is characterized by a separate robust-control recursion. For bounded infinite discounted games, the public-equilibrium correspondence is the greatest self-generating fixed point under set inclusion. On Cartesian response domains the robust recursion reduces to strict blocking-price inequalities, with pathwise working capital replacing total cost when installed outcomes regenerate political resources. A coarsest quotient under the declared cost- and action-preserving bisimulation preserves globally consistent Markov equilibria, but a public sunspot example proves that the quotient does not preserve unrestricted history-dependent equilibrium laws. Five paired constructions show that the semantic interpreter, joint-action compatibility, stochastic coupling, within-path liquidity timing, and continuation incentives are each indispensable to a general characterization. The encoding frontier ranges from polynomial backward induction to membership problems that are complete for the existential theory of the reals, for PSPACE, and for EXPTIME. What remains open is a finite computable representation of the full history-dependent fixed point when catalogs, accounts, and the relevant public memory are not exogenously bounded.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
K. Fathi (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 8 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: