SUMMARY This paper discusses the use of performance related pay (PRP) as a means of control over the relationship between effort and reward. Taking a critical perspective, it describes how the implementation of PRP in a UK‐based electronics company has been used as a device to remove trade union influence in wage‐setting arrangements and to effect changes in employee behaviour. The opinions of supervisors, line managers, personnel managers and shop‐floor staff are discussed and the implications for management control are assessed. The paper concludes that from management's perspective the PRP system appears to have been a success, for it has in some cases ‘commercialized’ the relationship between effort and reward, and has pre‐empted expressions of employee resistance.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Procter et al. (1993) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched one closely related paper. Consider it for comparative context: