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Abstract In the last decades deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) have gained significant attention as tools to reform and complement representative democracies, with many governments adopting them. Political representatives, though cautious about power dynamics, seem moderately supportive of extending these procedures. However, little is known about how this predisposition is affected by the institutional design of these procedures and how this might affect their adoption. This paper addresses this gap by presenting results from a conjoint experiment in France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Poland. The study, involving 716 representatives, examines how different attributes of deliberative procedures influence decisions to fund their adoption at the local and European levels. Findings show that the binding nature of DMPs is less important than composition characteristics, such as involving representatives in deliberations with citizens and organized civil society. Differences in preferences between local and European levels suggest awareness of challenges in scaling up DMPs.
Ramis-Moyano et al. (Wed,) studied this question.