Sanctions, countersanctions, and power: When and how international organizations de-escalate geoeconomic conflict ¹

This article asks when sanctioned states adopt countersanctions and to what extent sender states can reduce this risk by acting through international organizations (IOs). Conventional wisdom associates sanctions with powerful states, yet around one-fifth of sanctions are imposed by sender coalitions that are materially weaker than their targets. I argue that these weaker senders face a higher baseline risk of countersanctions but can partially offset this vulnerability by securing IO support for their sanctions. IOs matter in two ways: first, they help coordinate and sustain sender coalitions and signal broader backing in case of escalation; second, their endorsement legitimizes initial sanctions, thereby raising the political and reputational costs of retaliatory measures. The broad relevance of the argument is illustrated with case examples and supported by large-N quantitative analyses. In policy terms, the findings suggest that, amid growing geoeconomic fragmentation, IOs can meaningfully reduce escalation risks for both smaller states and major powers confronting materially powerful peers.