Working paper explores how blank resignations affect legislative power dynamics, indicating structural imbalances.
This working paper proposes concentration by subtraction as the structural mirror image of the classical suma del poder público: a mechanism by which one actor, holding no office larger than a single legislative seat, conditions the tenure of other formal power-holders without ever receiving a constitutional grant of extraordinary power. The paper develops the argument through the Misiones province case in Argentina (2007-2026), modeling the alleged blank-resignation mechanism as a forced pooling equilibrium rather than a genuine evolutionarily stable strategy, and comparing the gap left by Article 29 of the Argentine Constitution, Article 67.2 of the Spanish Constitution, and STC 5/1983. This record is a working-paper v0.1 companion to The Captured Renewer Problem and is part of the Law as Extended Phenotype research program.
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Ignacio Adrián LERER (2026) studied this question.
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