Strategic selectivity and hybrid state capitalism: the political economy of sepi and the transformation of Spanish state ownership

This article analyses the political economy of state ownership and privatisation in Spain through the lens of strategic selectivity [Jessop, B. (2002). The future of the capitalist state. Polity Press] and recent theories of hybrid state capitalism. It argues that the creation and endurance of the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) reflect not a withdrawal of the state from the economy but its strategic adaptation. By adopting a hybrid holding structure, the Spanish state developed a mechanism that provided managerial autonomy and economic flexibility while maintaining long-term strategic influence. SEPI can be understood as a state holding company responsible for managing the Spanish state's portfolio of corporate shareholdings, although legally it is constituted as a public law entity operating largely under private law. This selective institutional design allowed the state to navigate the constraints of European integration and fiscal discipline, transforming its role from a direct producer to a sophisticated strategic shareholder.