I’ll Bribe You Because I Trust You: Street-Level Bureaucracy, Discretion, Social Capital, and Petty Corruption in Latin America

Street-level bureaucrats often have monopoly control and discretion over citizens’ access to public services, enabling them to exploit this power by soliciting bribes. This paper examines the relationship between generalized and community trust and different types of street-level bribery requests in service delivery. Using data from 18 Latin American countries between 2004 and 2014, we find that individuals who generally trust others, and those living in municipalities with high levels of generalized trust, face a higher probability of receiving bribe requests for public services. However, generalized trust has no effect when the bribe involves police interactions. In contrast, respondents who report high levels of community trust, and those in municipalities with strong community trust, are less likely to face bribe requests. These findings suggest that low generalized trust may contribute to sustaining or even increasing bribery, while community trust appears to inhibit it. The results underscore the importance of local context in understanding corruption dynamics and suggest that when social norms conflict with formal laws, the prevailing norms, particularly around trust, can influence behavior. Overall, the study highlights the differentiated effects of trust types on corruption and the relevance of social context in shaping street-level interactions.