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This article uses a conceptual and historical approach to reinterpret economic rent in the context of digital platforms and intangible data resources. It develops an ideal-typical account of three historically dominant modalities of rent formation—agrarian land surpluses (Rent I), capital-intensive improvements (Rent II), and digital rent (Rent III)—to explain how surplus extraction migrates as scarcity shifts from natural endowments to infrastructural control and finally to data-driven intermediation. These modalities overlap historically rather than replacing one another mechanically. By anchoring rent to evolving knowledge, replicability constraints, and platform-controlled digital constraints, the article clarifies historical controversies while distinguishing digital rent from monopoly profits, intellectual-property rents, and data-dividend proposals. To complement the conceptual argument, the article also adds descriptive evidence from Meta’s advertising model, early implementation of the EU Digital Markets Act, and a comparison of EU, California, U.S. federal, and Chinese regulatory approaches to digital-rent control.
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Ünsal Özdilek (2026) studied this question.
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