Civil–Military Relations—Who Are the Real Principals? A Response to “Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War”

This response to Coletta's “Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War” argues that too much significance is attributed to Shinseki's remarks. The larger question is whether military leaders should speak up when their civilian leadership's plan is grossly inadequate. Second, the response considers questions about the middle levels of power. The authors suggest that the principal–agent argument is Shinseki's defense and the ultimate principals are the American public. Third, a table is offered as a means of comparing and contrasting the Huntington–Janowitz positions with new theoretical focuses. Fourth, the conclusion suggests that concerns touched on in the tables (the obligation to speak up, the public space, the implications of economic development, and the changing nature of warfare) overshadow the Shinseki issue and that social action theory and type construction methodology are of service in addressing civil–military relations.