HE FOUNDERS of the American Republic sought to establish a regime of republican liberty, that is, a government that would protect the individual rights of person and property and that would be founded oil the consent of the governed. Such a regime suffered from a central weakness. History and theory warned that republican liberty could destroy itself by reason of the very diversity that liberty must breed. The task of government was to concert the powers of the people in defense of their liberties. But as their interests multiplied and their opinions divided, how could a government responsive to these interests and opinions achieve such a concert? By what dialectic could the regime of liberty generate the union necessary for its own survival? The new regime had dispensed with the props that governments had previously found in hierarchy and class, dynastic right, and aristocratic tradition. It could hope to enjoy the solidarity that came from giving individuals a say in how they were governed and a chance to better themselves by their own efforts. The fragility of an order based largely on the satisfactions of self-interest and commitment to impersonal ideals, however, was widely felt. Thoughtful people recognized that the young republic would have to enlist in its support the hearts of its citizens as well as their good sense and conscience. Vaguely, but earnestly, they spoke of the need for attachment to its institutions and affection among its people, for veneration and for sympathy.' These doubts about the new regime did not arise from some circumstance, material or ideal, peculiar to America. In the West generally the
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Samuel H. Beer (1984) studied this question.