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This research examined the dynamic relationship between competition and bank risk in the credit market, focusing on the moral hazard faced by both banks and borrowers. By integrating the “competition-fragility” and “competition-stability” perspectives, this research revealed the complex impact of competition on bank risk in this financial context. Our research empirically tested the new theoretical framework established by a dynamic game model in our study using a dataset of 738 commercial banks in China from 2008 to 2022. The results revealed an inverted U-shaped, curvilinear relationship between competition and bank risk. Specifically, competition has a dual effect: it mitigates the moral hazard for borrowers while worsening it for banks. This illustrates both risk-shifting and risk-margin effects within competitive dynamics. Ultimately, the nonlinear link between competition and bank risk is driven by the interaction of moral hazard factors influencing both parties. The dual effect of competition highlighted in our findings is particularly relevant, as the global banking sector faces increasing competition from new entrants such as fintech firms and digital banks, banks striving to develop suitable risk management strategies, and regulators attempting to determine the appropriate level of intervention.
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Lu et al. (2026) studied this question.
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