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A. Firms and Price Setting1. Production of Domestic Intermediate GoodsThere is a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods (indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] ) in the South block, each of which is produced by a single monopolistically competitive firm. In the domestic market, firm i faces a demand function that varies inversely with its output price PDt(i) and directly with aggregate demand at home YDt : where θp > 0 , and PDt is an aggregate price index defined below. Similarly, firm i faces the export demand function where Xt denotes the quantity demanded of domestic good i in the North block, denotes the price that firm i sets in the North market, is the import price index in the North, and is an aggregate of the North’s imports (we use an asterisk to denote the North block’s variables).Each producer utilizes capital services Kt(i) and a labor index Lt(i) (defined below) to produce its respective output good. The production function is assumed to have a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form:The production function exhibits constant returns to scale in both inputs, and Zt is a country-specific shock to the level of technology. Firms face perfectly competitive factor markets for hiring capital and labor. Thus, each firm chooses Kt(i) and Lt(i) , taking as given both the rental price of capital RKt and the aggregate wage index Wt (defined below). Firms can costlessly adjust either factor of production, which implies that each firm has an identical marginal cost per unit of output, MCt .We assume that each intermediate goods producer sets the same price PDt(i) in both blocks of the currency union, implying that and that . The prices of the intermediate goods are determined by Calvo-style staggered contracts (see Calvo 1983; Yun 1996). In each period, a firm faces a constant probability, 1 − ξp , of being able to reoptimize its price ( PDt(i) ). This probability of receiving a signal to reoptimize is independent across firms and time. If a firm is not allowed to optimize its prices, we follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005) and assume that the firm must reset its home price as a weighted combination of the lagged and steady-state rate of inflation for the nonoptimizing firms. When ιp is set close to unity, this formulation introduces structural inertia into the price-setting equation.When a firm i is allowed to reoptimize its price in the domestic market in period t, the firm maximizes The operator represents the conditional expectation based on the information available to agents at period t. The firm discounts profits received at date t + j by the state-contingent discount factor ψt,t+j ; for notational simplicity, we have suppressed all of the state indices.2 The first-order condition for setting the contract price of good i in the home market is The problem for firm i of reoptimizing its price for the export market in period t is identical to that in (4), with the exception that Xt+k(i) enters instead of YDt+j .2. Production of the Domestic Output IndexBecause households have identical Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, it is convenient to assume that a representative aggregator combines the differentiated intermediate products into a composite home-produced good YDt: The aggregator chooses the bundle of goods that minimizes the cost of producing YDt, taking the price PDt(i) of each intermediate good YDt(i) as given. The aggregator sells units of each sectoral output index at its unit cost PDt: We also assume a representative aggregator in the foreign economy that combines the differentiated home products Xt(i) into a single index for foreign imports, and sells at price :3. Production of Consumption and Investment GoodsFinal consumption goods are produced by a representative consumption goods distributor. This firm combines purchases of domestically produced goods with imported goods to produce a final consumption good (CAt ) according to a constant returns to scale CES production function:where CDt denotes the consumption good distributor’s demand for the index of domestically produced goods, MCt denotes the distributor’s demand for the index of foreign-produced goods, and φCt reflects costs of adjusting consumption imports. The final consumption good is used by both households and the government. The form of the production function mirrors the preferences of households and the government sector over consumption of domestically produced goods and imports. Accordingly, the quasi-share parameter ωC may be interpreted as determining the preferences of both the private and public sectors for domestic relative to foreign consumption goods or, equivalently, the degree of home bias in consumption expenditure. Finally, the adjustment cost term φCt is assumed to take the quadratic form: This specification implies that it is costly to change the proportion of domestic and foreign goods in the aggregate consumption bundle, even though the level of imports may jump costlessly in response to changes in overall consumption demand.Given the presence of adjustment costs, the representative consumption goods distributor chooses (a contingency plan for) CDt and MCt to minimize its discounted expected costs of producing the aggregate consumption good:The distributor sells the final consumption good to households and the government at a price PCt, which may be interpreted as the consumption price index (or, equivalently, as the shadow cost of producing an additional unit of the consumption good).We model the production of final investment goods in an analogous manner, although we allow the weight ωI in the investment index to differ from that of the weight ωC in the consumption goods index.3
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Erceg et al. (2011) studied this question.
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