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Conceptual review traces three phases of Michael Jensen's scholarship on corporate governance, highlighting his integration of integrity and stakeholder perspectives into modern firm theory.
Michael Cole Jensen (1939–2024) passed away on April 2, 2024 in Sarasota, Florida. A number of fitting tributes have appeared celebrating the life of one of the world's most productive and influential financial economists. A tribute to Jensen by Eugene Fama on the University of Chicago website ProMarket emphasizes how Jensen's research contributions put him in the highest echelons of academic finance and economics. Fama cites several of Jensen's seminal papers, including his 1976 paper coauthored with William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.”1 Jensen's paper with Meckling became the most heavily cited paper in the corporate finance literature and established agency theory as the dominant theory of the firm in finance and accounting. Fama also highlights Jensen's role in the transformation of finance into a scientific discipline, noting that he founded the Journal of Financial Economics in 1974 and edited it for over 20 years to drag the Journal of Finance “into the era of scientific research.” Finally, Fama highlights Jensen's leadership and foresight in launching the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) in 1994 to advance research across the social sciences.2 Another tribute to Jensen on ProMarket by Cambridge Law Professor Brian Cheffins suggests that Jensen's thinking on the public corporation underwent a 180-degree turn. In Cheffins's account, Jensen began his career as a strong advocate of the corporation as a driver of innovation and growth in the economy, calling it “an awesome social invention” in his seminal article with Meckling. After the economic stagnation and rampant inflation of the 1970s, however, Jensen allegedly became a fierce critic of the corporation, expressing skepticism about internal corporate systems and emphasizing the effectiveness of the market for corporate control to discipline manager opportunism. Cheffins highlights Jensen's promotion of the corporate takeover boom of the 1980s and the proliferation of incentive pay for executives based on stock options and earnings targets. When the takeover boom suddenly halted in the 1990s, Cheffins notes that Jensen blamed executives and politicians who had put up roadblocks to corporate takeovers. Jensen also criticized self-serving managers and compliant boards who had used incentive pay to shield executives from market risk while adding significantly to their total compensation. Yet, public corporations continued to grow in number and size and were a major contributor to strong economic growth and soaring stock prices throughout the 1990s. But in Cheffins’ view, for all the accomplishments of US public companies, “there would be no reversal of Jensen's 180 degree turn regarding the public company.”3 In contrast to prior tributes, we focus on Jensen's contributions to the theory of the firm over his illustrious career. We argue that his contributions in this area represent the greatest and yet, in some respects, the most misunderstood part of Jensen's legacy. We identify three phases or “acts” in Jensen's thinking regarding the public corporation and the role of management. Consistent with Cheffins’ tribute, we argue that Jensen had a 180-degree turn in his thinking after the economic stagnation of the 1970s and became a fierce critic of certain practices of the public corporation. However, we argue that Jensen renewed (if indeed he ever completely lost) his confidence in the public corporation later in life. That renewed confidence came with the realization that his original theory of the firm was incomplete. We focus on Jensen's third act, where he attempted to revise his theory by incorporating integrity and stakeholder perspectives and developed a highly innovative educational program for leadership training. Despite the dramatic changes we observe across these three acts, however, we identify a continuity in Jensen's thought that provides a path forward for future development in the theory of the firm to address the challenges of modern capitalism. Jensen received his PhD at the University of Chicago in 1968, at a time when the economics department had already pivoted from the institutional economics of Thorstein Veblen and Frank Knight to the neoclassical economics of Milton Friedman and George Stigler. His dissertation, which was supervised by Merton Miller, developed a method of measuring fund manager performance called Jensen's alpha and was later published in The Journal of Finance.4 Through his association with Miller and Eugene Fama at Chicago, Jensen's early work focused on market efficiency, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and market reactions to financial information releases. For example, he coauthored a 1969 paper with Fama, Lawrence Fisher, and Richard Roll establishing the event-study method that became the standard in capital market studies in finance and accounting.5 Most academic researchers, however, associate Jensen's early career with the powerful theory of the firm he developed with William Meckling called agency theory. Previous theories of the firm used the marginal analysis presented by Alfred Marshall (1842–1924) in his early synthesis of neoclassical economics at Cambridge University. It was under Marshall's influence that Cambridge dropped political economy from the moral sciences in 1903 before expunging the label “political” in its attempts to make the field of economics an objective science.6 Based on Marshall's price theory, economists initially modeled the firm as a set of cost and demand curves categorized by market structure (whether perfect competition, pure monopoly, monopolistic competition, or some other intermediate variation thereof). The economic function of a firm was said to be to combine economic resources (plant, machinery, labor, etc.) in order to produce goods and services demanded by consumers. The first task of a theory of the firm, therefore, is to explain why firm coordination is superior to market coordination. In his seminal paper published in 1937 entitled, “The Nature of the Firm,” Ronald Coase (1910–2013) argued that firms emerge from a competitive process as the most efficient, or least-cost, means of coordinating economic activity. Coase also argued that firm size is influenced by rising marginal costs of organization and supervision, so a firm will eventually stop growing when the marginal costs rise to meet the marginal benefits.7 In contrast to previous neoclassical theories, Jensen and Meckling viewed the firm as a “nexus of contracts” among all the different stakeholders with claims on the firm. Their theory of the firm focused on the agency relationship that arises when a principal hires an agent to perform some task that involves the delegation of decision-making authority. Jensen argued that agency relationships exist in all organizations and across all levels of management, including the relationship between shareholders and managers of a public corporation. Given the traditional assumptions of information asymmetry and self-interested agents, the theory characterized the principal's problem as choosing some combination of formal contracting and financial incentives to control opportunistic behavior on the part of agents to maximize the wealth of the firm's shareholders (as the residual claimants). Like previous neoclassical theories, agency theory assumed that individuals have a well-defined utility function with preferences only for wealth and leisure. Although Jensen and Meckling themselves made serious efforts to investigate alternative models of human behavior,8 the Jensen-Meckling agency framework nevertheless relied on self-interested maximizing behavior to make the theory tractable for their formal modeling and theorizing. The underlying behavioral assumptions of agency theory contrasted sharply with the assumptions of institutional economic theory, which characterized economic agents as influenced by nonfinancial factors such as social norms, institutions, and culture. Institutional economists had established business schools in the new research university in the late 19th century and their theoretical perspective still dominated the nation's business schools.9 Agency theory created a unified approach to organizations that would have repercussions in corporate finance, organizational behavior, accounting, and corporate governance. Unlike much of the earlier scholarship in business school, the core ideas of agency theory were derived not from inductive observation and practical experience but, instead, from the theoretical musing of a newly revitalized neoclassical economic theory.10 Jensen played a central role in promoting agency theory through his own research and in his role as editor of the Journal of Financial Economics. Further, he promoted the theory in practitioner-oriented outlets such as the Harvard Business Review and the Wall Street Journal. Finally, Jensen promoted his theory of the firm to students in his MBA courses at the University of Rochester and later at Harvard. Between 1967 and 1988, Jensen taught finance and business administration at the University of Rochester Graduate School of Business Administration. He joined the Harvard Business School on a half-time appointment in 1985, dividing his time between Rochester and Harvard, before taking a full-time appointment at Harvard in 1988. So powerful was the course in creating a particular point of view, Jensen said, that students found that the logic and outlook of CCMO challenged “some of their deeply felt beliefs.” The course helped students, Jensen argued, to become more “tough-minded” and shifted them away from the “stakeholder model” of organizational purpose, which was “dear to the hearts of many of our students.”11 Khurana credits Jensen's influence at Rochester and Harvard with changing the focus of management training from the “higher aims” of institutional economists to the “hired hands” of a renewed neoclassical theory. Jensen took pains to make clear that the objective of firm management was to maximize total enterprise value (the market value of debt plus equity). In Khurana's telling of the story, however, agency theory reduced corporate managers and their “captured” regulators to self-interested opportunists and narrowed managerial responsibilities to “the maximization of stock price.”12 The neoclassical theory of the firm developed by Jensen and Meckling focused on three mechanisms for managing the agency conflict between managers and owners of the firm: (1) monitoring managerial performance, (2) providing economic incentives, and (3) promoting an active market for corporate control. The first mechanism incorporated accounting disclosures, internal control systems, and a professional board of directors. The second mechanism incorporated powerful financial incentives that aligned the financial interests of managers with shareholders. The third mechanism incorporated the threat that poorly performing management “insiders” would be replaced by efficiency- and profit-oriented “outsiders.” Jensen blamed the economic stagnation of the 1970s and early 1980s to top management's opportunistic pursuit of growth and diversification. The solution, according to Jensen, was to subject these managers to the discipline of the financial markets. By promoting a view of managers as opportunistic agents pursuing an agenda at odds with investors, Jensen harkened back to an earlier era in America. During the second industrial revolution, investors like J. P. Morgan took large debt and equity positions in public companies and often participated in stock price manipulation and strategic decision-making. Morgan himself famously quipped, “I owe the public nothing.” In a similarly provocative spirit, Milton Friedman published his famous article in the New York Times Magazine in 1970 arguing that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.” According to Khurana, Jensen viewed Friedman's article as “a sign of growing academic skepticism about managerialism and an important cultural event in its own right.”13 In what we characterize as his second act, Jensen came to doubt the effectiveness of corporate governance and management control and looked to economic incentives and the market for corporate control to motivate managers to act in the best interest of shareholders. As Cheffins argues in his tribute, Jensen's writings in the popular press during this time encouraged a large wave of takeover and restructuring activity in America in the 1980s as well as a dramatic increase in CEO compensation.14 The dramatic increase in CEO compensation during this time was also heralded by Jensen's four-decade collaboration with Kevin Murphy. In their seminal paper published in 1990 in the Journal of Political Economy, Jensen and Murphy argued that executive compensation was not sufficiently “high-powered.”15 In particular, they argued that executive compensation should take the form of increased stock ownership or be tied substantially to the stock price of the firm. 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In particular, Jensen developed and promoted a model for how with the of that substantially performance while Jensen had from leadership that its over organizational effectiveness to a practical for In contrast to the behavioral assumptions of agency theory, however, Jensen's leadership training integrity as well as of stakeholder theory. In this tribute to Michael Jensen, we three phases or “acts” in his thinking regarding the public corporation and the role of management. In his first act, Jensen on the neoclassical economic theory of the Chicago School to a theory of the firm that management a In his second act, Jensen the market for corporate control and financial incentives as for opportunistic We focus on Jensen's third act, where he attempted to revise his theory by incorporating integrity and stakeholder perspectives and developed a highly innovative educational program for leadership training. As we to Jensen's by his on the theory of the firm. Despite the dramatic changes we observe across the three of Jensen's we identify a continuity of thought that provides a path forward for future development in the theory of the firm. In act, for example, we Jensen on previous from neoclassical economic theory to the firm. In particular, Jensen's efforts to of stakeholder theory, and leadership training later in life on previous from neoclassical economic theory. In contrast to Jensen's to however, agency have used moral theory to and social into the theory of the these efforts and Jensen's efforts to his theory of the firm later in life turn to be his greatest legacy.
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