Key result
No abstract data is available to determine the findings regarding Medicare's Bundled Payment Program for Joint Replacement.
Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
No abstract data on Medicare joint replacement bundles; leaves open effects on costs and outcomes.
The United States is in the midst of a bold experiment. Medicare is moving rapidly away from traditional fee-for-service payment. Various alternative payment models (APMs) intended to improve quality and reduce costs are being implemented or tested. The stakes are high. If an evaluation finds that a new model meets the statutory requirements for expansion, the US Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to expand the models across the country. Whether these new programs work and how effectively they are evaluated should matter to physicians, patients, and taxpayers. While accountable care organizations (ACOs) represent the largest current APM (about $85 billion per year1), bundled payment initiatives, under which physicians or health care organizations are paid for all related services within an episode of care, are expanding rapidly.2 The largest of these is the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative (about $10 billion per year1), a voluntary program that was phased in between 2013 and 2015 in which about 1400 organizations are participating. The article by Dummit et al3 in this issue of JAMA is the first glimpse of how BPCI is performing. This report is important for several reasons: it is by far the largest study of bundled payments to date; it focuses on bundled payments for lower extremity joint replacement (approximately 400 000 procedures per year); and the payment model evaluated is similar to the recently launched Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement initiative—under which all hospitals within 67 metropolitan statistical areas are required to participate. Under this model, the episode of care begins with an inpatient stay in an acute care hospital and includes all related services for up to 90 days after discharge. Medicare sets a target price but continues to make fee-for-service payments to all eligible physicians, hospitals, and other health care organizations. Medicare then compares total episode payments with the target price. If the participating organization maintains or improves quality, it is eligible to receive savings below a small discount (generally 3%) that is intended to ensure that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) receives at least some savings. The model entails risk bearing; if total costs for the episode exceed the target price, participating organizations must pay some portion of that excess to CMS. The article by Dummit and colleagues reports findings from the first 21 months of the BPCI program, a time when organizations were transitioning to risk bearing and the average organization bore financial risk for only 10 months. The study compares changes in spending, utilization, and quality for Medicare beneficiaries who underwent lower extremity joint replacement during a baseline period before the BPCI initiative was launched (October 2011 through September 2012) and the early intervention period (October 2013 through June 2015). Episodes delivered at the 176 BPCI-participating hospitals were compared with a sample of episodes drawn from a matched sample of 841 nonparticipating hospitals. All patients at the BPCI hospitals were included (n = 29 441 in the baseline period; n = 31 700 in the intervention period); a matched comparison population was randomly selected from the hospitals not participating in the BPCI initiative (n = 29 440 and n = 31 696, respectively). By taking this difference-in-differences approach, the study design is intended to take account of other changes in payment or policy that may have occurred during this period and thereby isolate the effect of the new payment incentive on the participating hospitals and physicians. The major finding of the study is that while spending decreased in both the intervention and control populations, the decrease was significantly greater for health care organizations in the BPCI. For hospitals participating in the BPCI initiative, mean Medicare payments for the hospitalization and 90-day postdischarge period were $30 551 during the baseline period and decreased to $27 265 during the intervention period. In the comparison hospitals, mean episode payments were $30 057 at baseline and decreased to $27 938 during the intervention period. Payments declined $1166 more (95% CI, −$1634 to −$699) in the BPCI hospitals than in the comparison group. Almost all of the reduction in spending was from reduced use of institutional postacute care. The study found no evidence that quality of care was worse in those hospitals participating in the BPCI initiative. Claimsbased measures of quality—unplanned readmissions and emergency department visits—were nearly identical at baseline in BPCI and control hospitals and changed in similar ways during the intervention period. Although the study was underpowered to detect differences in mortality rates, 30-day and 90-day postdischarge mortality rates were identical in BPCI and control hospitals at both baseline and follow-up. The evaluation also included a survey of patients approximately 6 months after surgery during the intervention period in the BPCI and control hospitals. The findings should be interpreted with caution, largely because patients were asked to recall their functional ability before surgery (an approach of uncertain validity). Nevertheless, a higher proportion of patients in the BPCI Related article Opinion
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Elliott S. Fisher (2016) studied Joint replacement. Medicare's Bundled Payment Program was evaluated. No abstract data is available to determine the findings regarding Medicare's Bundled Payment Program for Joint Replacement.
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