How Does Public Disclosure of Performance Information Affect Politicians’ Attitudes towards Effort Allocation? Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Does relative performance information (PI) still impact politicians’ attitudes when the potential for external blame or credit is limited? And, if not, is the active disclosure of PI about government activities with a low propensity for media attention an effective strategy for increasing the effect of PI? Despite the tendency to progressively disclose PI, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of publicly disclosing PI is almost non-existent. Hence, a survey embedded experiment was developed, building on self-determination theory and blame-avoidance theory, to assess how the provision of PI with a low propensity to attract media attention affects politicians’ attitudes towards resource allocation and whether this effect is altered by the public disclosure of PI. Data from 795 Belgian (Flemish) local councilors indicates that PI with a low propensity for media attention does impact politicians’ attitudes towards effort allocation but that public disclosure of PI mitigates the effect size in the case of negative-valence PI. Thus, the results draw attention to the unintended—and potentially dysfunctional—effects of the disclosure of PI.