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This commentary critiques recent arguments for mental state minimalism, the view that infants initially understand only behaviours and not mental states. The minimalist evolutionary claim that animals in general evolved to track behaviours may be true, but it does not address whether human infants in particular evolved to additionally track mental states, which plausibly occurred given the selection pressures of hominin cooperative breeding. Minimalist critiques of theory of mind tasks as a source of evidence for the mentalist view that infants do understand mental states may have merit, but there is abundant evidence that infants understand mental states other than those assessed by traditional theory of mind tasks, such as affective and attentional states. Proposed minimalist mechanisms for the transition from behaviour understanding to mental state understanding are inadequate because they presuppose mental state understanding, occur too late in ontogeny, or do not challenge the central claim of mentalism. Overall, future research should proceed on the assumption that infants do understand something about mental states and that this knowledge is not based solely on learning from the observed behaviour of others.
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Li et al. (2025) studied this question.
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