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National governments have increasingly enacted legislation to regulate globalized supply chains, particularly to prevent human rights abuses committed by national companies abroad. As these laws touch upon diverse interests—from domestic business concerns affecting imports to labor regulations in third countries—they affect a broad spectrum of societal actors. Recent studies on global supply chain governance have shown that these laws notonly differ in their effects but are also strongly shaped by national discourses. While existing scholarship has largely focused on the final legislation and its effectiveness, much less is known about how such laws are contested during the legislative process itself. This study addresses this gapby examining the positions of business and public interest groups in the case of the German Supply Chain Act (GSCA), a key example of national foreign economic policy. We identify the main positions of these interest groups, analyze how they articulate them, and assess how far they are reflected in the final bill. Our findings (i) reveal differing conflict structures across issue areas, (ii) show that public and business interest groups focus on distinct lobbying arenas, and (iii) demonstrate that public interest groups were more successful in shaping the GSCA.
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Hüttemann et al. (2025) studied this question.
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