Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The Chinese state has sought to reassert its authority over the countryside by strengthening village Party organizations and empowering village Party secretaries. It is also mobilizing other rural actors to support its policy agenda. Under the Rural Revitalization Strategy, local governments are required to mobilize rural elites (e.g., entrepreneurs and village elders) to participate in local governance. This study asks: How does the Party empower new rural elites to participate in rural policy implementation and keep them under control at the same time? Drawing on an in-depth case study, the article argues that local governments are using New Rural Elite Associations to pursue these two goals simultaneously. Specifically, we that find such associations carry three functions: (1) recruitment, (2) containment, and (3) mobilization. Nevertheless, we find that local governments are not able to treat New Rural Elite Associations as their subordinates but must meet certain conditions to secure their support.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Zhao et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: