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Contrary to the legal norm, the functions of managing the business of a corporation and making business policy generally vest in the executives rather than the board.After examining the reasons why this condition prevails, Professor Eisenberg analyzes past proposals for reform, which typically have sought ways to reinvest these functions in the directors.Finding fault with the premise of these proposed reforms-that directors can successfully either manage or make business policy in modern, complex corporations-he then assesses the remaining functions of the board.His conclusion is that one such function, monitoring the performance of the chief executive's office, is both critical to the corporation and uniquely suited to the board.He therefore proposes changes in the law of corporations and corporate accounting to ensure that the board will have adequate independence and sufficient data to perform this monitoring function effectively.A major function of corporation law is to regulate the manner in which the corporation is constituted; either directly, by distributing decisionmaking power among the various corporate organs, or indirectly, by setting the parameters within which the private actors can make such a distribution themselves.At the core of the distributive apparatus of most corporate statutes is a deceptively simple provision: "The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors."'This provision, in turn, reflects what might be called t Copyright 1975 by Melvin Aron Eisenberg.Th's is the fourth and last in a series of articles on the allocation of legal powers within the modem corporation.See
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