What question did this study set out to answer?

To explore a model explaining recurring IT-related control deficiencies without collusion or misaligned incentives.

August 4, 2026Open Access

An Equilibrium Without Collusion: Observability, Strategic Inattention, and the Recurrence of IT-Related Control Deficiencies

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To explore a model explaining recurring IT-related control deficiencies without collusion or misaligned incentives.
Developed a three-player model involving a core auditor, IT specialist, and audited entity.
Analyzed the role of observability in influencing behavior and control outcomes.
Investigated the concept of strategic inattention among auditors regarding the work of specialists.
Identified that low observability leads to a lack of effort from specialists, maintaining control deficiencies.
Demonstrated that increasing penalties for auditors can inadvertently reduce observability, worsening inattention.
Highlighted that clarifying specialist work can improve accountability and reduce audit deficiencies.

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Reveals recurring IT-related control deficiencies in auditors and specialists, suggesting implications for regulation.

Mikio Hanaeda (2026) studied this question.

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