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D. A. Pizarro and P. Bloom (2003) argued against the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001) and for a modified rationalist model. This reply responds to their 2 main arguments by demonstrating that an intuitionist model allows for malleability and flexibility in judgment, and it allows for cases of moral deliberation. A critique and reply are most productive when the authors on both sides share some areas of agreement and a sense of mutual respect. I am very fortunate that the present exchange seems likely to be productive. Pizarro, Bloom, and I all agree on the big picture of moral psychology: The field badly needed updating. A field that was a major part of the cognitive revolution needed to be brought forward through the affect revolution of the 1980s and into the age of automaticity and dual process models that began in the 1990s (e.g., Bargh, 1994). We also agree with the insight of Nisbett and Wilson (1977) that people often do not know or cannot explain why they
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Jonathan Haidt (2003) studied this question.
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