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The late philosopher Richard Rorty was at root an honest liberal, fearlessly ready to trace the implications of his democratic commitments into deep domains of metaphysical inquiry. He managed an intellectual modesty that was also ruthlessly iconoclastic, situating himself as a great warrior in the sophistic tradition stretching back to Gorgias and continuing up through Nietzsche and later Wittgenstein. Like all sophistry, Rorty took aim at the notion of Truth itself, challenging the idea that philosophy can sort out those vocabularies which provide access to The World as It Is from those that cannot. In doing so, Rorty saw himself as increasing democratic respect for what Foucault called "the multiplicity of discourses," emphasizing that ways of seeing the world supposed to lack epistemic rigor need not be understood as imperfect approximations of science or mathematics. Instead, Rorty envisioned a culture in which science and math are seen as useful descriptions, but not because they deploy a "method" which approximates the one true reality nor because they possess some property supposed to distinguish their ontological nature from, say, literature, poetry, anthropology, or economics. The Rortian strategy for further democratizing culture, then, was to drop the presumption of western philosophy as an activity that can bestow epistemic privilege on deserving modes of inquiry. Replacing themes of objectivity with themes of solidarity and hope is supposed to democratize discourse by equalizing them
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Steven Schoonover (2017) studied this question.
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