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This article explores the reasons for the existence of a preference for highly skilled migrant workers over nationals in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). We argue that the GCC kafāla system allows leaders to manage trust deficits by hiring elite expatriates, whom we liken to Ottoman Janissaries and describe as “corporate Janissaries”. Offered attractive employment conditions but constrained by limited exit options, these workers become dependent on their employers, securing loyalty but ultimately hindering long-term organizational performance, innovation, and knowledge transfer. Historical reliance on tribalism and personal networks exacerbates trust deficits, as family members are often favored over more competent candidates. Although shifting economic landscapes and evolving citizenship policies are beginning to alter the attractiveness of national workers, trust deficits persist. Drawing on a political economy framework grounded in game theory and contract theory, we highlight the broader implications for human resource management and knowledge-based development in the GCC.
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Al‐Ubaydli et al. (2025) studied this question.
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