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This study examines whether the sequencing of state-owned enterprises'(SOEs’) actions influences the social efficiency of free entry in mixed oligopolies. We first demonstrate that in a closed economy, private entry is socially excessive regardless of the order of moves—whether under Cournot competition, public leadership, or private leadership.Extending the analysis to an open economy, we show that domestic private entry remains socially excessive when trade costs for foreign competitors exceed a critical threshold, again irrespective of action sequencing. This excess entry arises due to the interplay of output-substitution and business-stealing effects, which outweigh the gains in consumer surplus when foreign competition is weak.Our findings highlight that high trade costs amplify entry distortions, and that the role of SOEs—as leaders or followers—shapes both market outcomes and the need for regulatory intervention. These insights carry important implications for designing entry regulation policies in mixed markets and suggest potential benefits from international policy coordination to address cross-border welfare effects.
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Zhang et al. (2025) studied this question.
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