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In his article for this journal, ‘How should states recognise religion? Strengthening multicultural secularism’, Jonathan Chaplin presents a series of important challenges to our account of multicultural secularism, according to which the state can offer recognition to a range of religions while remaining sufficiently independent of them all. In this response to Chaplin’s critique, we shall concentrate on what we regard as the most important charges that he levels at our theory. We begin by arguing that it is important to maintain a clear distinction between groups and associations. Both may be objects of recognition and neither should be reduced to the other. We then focus on what we see as a key theme running through Chaplin’s critique: the claim that, by offering religious communities recognition, we threaten to undermine their freedom. By responding to this claim in three distinct ways, we hope to be able to further explicate and justify our account of multicultural secularism.
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Thompson et al. (2026) studied this question.
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