Fiction, Nonfiction, and Deceptive Photographic Representation

The relation between the photographic image and reality has arguably been the major concern of the vast bulk of the literature on photography (philosophical or otherwise) since the invention of the medium. This is understandable given that the very nature of photography has frequently been conceived of as “never less than the registering of an emanation, a material vestige of its subject.”1 This intimate link between the image and “the real” has undoubtedly influenced the function photographs perform in our societies: as snapshots, photographs are records, accurate public memories of our family and social life; as legal or journalistic documents, they are reliable evidence of an event, playing the part of a public eye. However, more than a century and a half after the advent of photography, the functions, uses, and possibilities of the medium have diversified, and sometimes, pace the recommendations of the modernists, the search for realism or its exploitation has been completely abandoned. These nonrealistic uses of photography have been well documented and studied by art historians and scholars from other disciplines.2 But they have received scarce attention from philosophers, many of whom still demonstrate a degree of skepticism about the possibility of nonrealistic photographs in general and fictional ones in particular. In this article, I explore some issues regarding the fictional capacity of photographs and their classification as fiction or nonfiction. In particular, I address the debate on the purported “fictional incompetence” of photography, whether photographs can or cannot represent ficta. In this debate, I side with theorists who defend the view that photographs can indeed represent fictive entities or ficta, but I offer an alternative argument: I claim that photographs can indeed represent ficta by photographic means, something that most theorists have denied. Then I consider some possible objections to my view and try to offer responses. Finally, I question whether representing fictive entities or events is all that is needed for a photograph to be fictional. In this context, I suggest what I take to be the correct way to classify deceptive photographs. Photographs are frequently characterized in the philosophical literature as natural images. Photographs, like shadows and fossils, bear a causal relation to their content: what is seen in photographs depends causally, and counterfactually, on the object that was in front of the camera at the moment of the shot. Moreover, the content of a photograph is not essentially dependent on the photographer's intentions. Paintings and drawings are different in this regard, for what we see in a painting is entirely dependent on the mind of the painter. Photographs, unlike paintings, are therefore visual traces of the objects that were in front of the lens when the photograph was shot.3 From this characterization of photography, some theorists have concluded that the photographic content is constrained by the particular real object that gave rise to the image, and consequently, they claim, photography is fictionally incompetent. Here are two paradigmatic defenses of this view, which I will call the “fictional incompetence of photography” (FIP): The relation between a photograph and its subject is a causal relation… . The photograph lacks that quality of “intentional existence,” which is characteristic of painting. The ideal photograph, therefore, is incapable of representing anything unreal.4 With regard to the choice of subject matter, the photographer (unlike the painter, sculptor or poet) is limited to a particular real or existing object or state of affairs. It is usually said, as a consequence, that traditional photography is “fictionally incompetent,” that is, it is a medium necessarily incapable of representing a fictional character or state of affairs.5 This view has been rejected by various authors. One line of defense has been to argue that there are modes of representation available to photography other than the physical portrayal of its source.6 According to Gregory Currie, for instance, photographs characteristically represent a certain subject or event by registering the presence of the subject or event, the source, that once stood before the lens. This way of representing, Currie maintains, is the only one that is specifically photographic. Yet this does not prevent photographs from representing fictional events or entities by other means. It is possible, for instance, that a photograph of a real subject (the source of the photo) is used to represent another. So while photographs cannot represent fictions by source, by origin, or by strictly photographic means, Currie maintains, they certainly can do so by use.7 Noël Carroll makes a similar argument with respect to cinematic works, claiming that there are various modes of representation in films. The shots of a photographic film will always physically portray the concrete particulars that caused the image, but this is by no means the only possible use of shots, nor is it necessarily the essential and most important one. The photographic shot also “depicts a member of a class describable by a general term.” So a photograph of, say, Clark Gable also represents a man, and this second mode, in a relevant context, “opens up another possibility of cinematic representation” that is what Carroll calls the “nominal portrayal”: “the nominal portrayal occurs when a shot represents a particular person, object or event different than its photographic provenance, due to its context as a result of factors like commentary, titles, an ongoing story or editing.”8 According to Carroll and Currie, then, a photograph or a cinematic shot that physically portrays Charlie Chaplin, a real person, by source can also (nominally) represent Charlot, a fictional character, by use. Certainly, Currie and Carroll agree, subjects differ in suitability when it comes to representation, even by use. As Carroll puts it, “it is hard to imagine how … a clean medium shot of Lenin [can] depict an ice cream soda.”9 However, there are certain effective ways of reducing what Currie calls “representational dissonance,” that is, methods by which the viewer's attention can be directed away from the subject represented by source while making the object represented by use more salient. Given the right conditions, then, Carroll and Currie contend, photographs can represent fictional entities. Now, although these arguments might be right and eventually convince us that the representation of fictional objects is indeed a possibility open to photography, it is not clear that they respond effectively to the challenge raised by those who endorse FIP. If FIP were simply a question of whether or not photographs can represent fictional entities or events simpliciter, these arguments would surely be enough to appease the skeptic. However, advocates of FIP do not deny that photographs can be used to represent fictions in a sense similar to that suggested by Currie and Carroll: Of course I may take a photograph of a draped nude and call it Venus, but insofar as this can be understood as an exercise in fiction, it should not be thought of as a photographic representation of Venus but rather as the photograph of a representation of Venus. In other words, the process of fictional representation occurs not in the photograph but in the subject: it is the subject which represents Venus; the photograph does no more than disseminate its visual character to other eyes.10 The charge against photography raised by FIP's advocates seems to be stronger: what they deny photography is the capacity to represent fictions by photographic means, that is, through the relevant causal relation of a source (a particular object) with the camera lens or the photosensitive surface. In this sense, Currie and Carroll's proposal does not offer a solution. In fact, even Currie agrees with FIP advocates that photographs cannot represent fictions by strictly photographic means.11 Certainly, the charge that advocates of FIP raise against photography holds true in one trivial sense: no one, not even realists about fictional characters, would maintain that fictional entities reflect or emit light. So it is obviously true that there cannot be photographs of ficta in their limited way, for ficta cannot causally interact with a photosensitive material. Less obvious, however, is that their description exhausts all the possible photographic means by which photographs can represent ficta. Now, in order to see what other photographic means there are available, we need to review our conception of the photographic process. Standard philosophical accounts of photography have generally provided an oversimplified view of the photographic practice. By overemphasizing the distinctive capacity of photographs to record the pro‐filmic scene without presupposing intentionality, theorists have often failed to account for how this record becomes an actual visual image. An alternative and perhaps more comprehensive account of photographic practice would need to account for the process between the moment light is impressed on the photosensitive material and the moment when the viewer experiences the photograph. Developing such an account in detail is beyond the scope of this article. However, drawing partially on the work of Dawn Phillips, I aim to say enough about the photographic process to justify the claim that there is an alternative, conception of photographic means that for the photographic representation of a photograph is a process that more than the of photosensitive material to a particular scene light. Certainly, this event, which calls the is it is at this that the of light is However, this by no means exhausts the process. In fact, as at this there is not a visual the of the of light is still that is, a to light or to another scene will the or or the photosensitive surface. The photosensitive material has to through to the one or many or us call this or the by the of us call this It is only when all these are that we can of the of a photograph. calls our attention to a of of the various in the of the photograph may a the might result in a photographic image to be very different from the of the pro‐filmic scene or the that all in the of a photograph can be or does not that this is always the we do not have in to that those are the process to be it seems to that when about photographic means, they that the of the photographic process is the only one that to be strictly since it is at this that the relevant causal relation of a source (a particular object) with the camera lens or the photosensitive is But should we FIP theorists have not given us as to this conceived of as they should the of our conception of photographic means. As a of fact, one argue the description of the photographic process I is up to the of the process there is not a visual image. So a relevant I is to we should for instance, what in the as photographic means. it is there that in many the image becomes the visual image we can call a photograph. Moreover, a many of the in the can be to be to photography or strictly photographic. not all in the strictly photographic photographic means in the or of the of light and its photosensitive material. or physically drawing on the for instance, may not be strictly photographic for they means different from the of light and its in order to an image or of an However, with say, a or a is indeed a photographic physically some of an image with may not as a photographic but a to the relevant of the image will surely methods that strictly photographic be and or of the image, of and the use of various of photosensitive and to the quality of the image. It seems to to consider these as photographic means, for after what they is not of photography, but its very the of light on photosensitive material. In view of we may to consider an alternative of photographic means, which be the or or the of an image, the of and that in the or of the of light and its a photosensitive material. that I not about in some may not be strictly photographic it may be a of and it may the image by means different from the and of light. this is not the with photography, there is a of and on and strictly photographic methods while the photographic image is these photographic which a degree of and about the photographic can be used to for of or for other such as representing ficta. is a photographic image that represents a a we can call it, or the of the a The or does not we not say that this photograph represents a fictional by photographic I we the that we can see in the was by that is, by two one the of a and the other the of a to one image, or by one If this is and there can be certain the of a photograph, other than those by that can as strictly we have an alternative way in which photographs can be to represent fictional entities by photographic means. The might that the image is fictionally However, may deny that it is a photograph, claiming that it should be as another not completely painting or this when that a photographer or or as photographer has a The argument will be the photographs are fictionally and is fictionally so is not a photograph. But this argument the Photographs, the argument are fictionally a is fictionally it is not a photograph. The is only true we that FIP is for we should take such as as this is not are there to is indeed a I there The image is with the about the nature of it is still a of the objects that it the presence of its Moreover, of this is important for the image. those in with the that photographs are can that one can still see the and the through the in order to the the photographer was constrained by a particular real or existing object or state of in a way that a would have the of the image depends on the of light the different of the scene reflect the photosensitive surface. It is the of the photographer to this in order to the image. the that certain such as this one, intentionality, or is with the view that photographs and differ in that the but not the can represent objects or events in the of or without of the The second is that is it is a photographic image and not a painting. painting of a similar would certainly not the but the that it is a photograph arguably this As we certain to and this us to the objects that were once in front of the But when with photographs such as that of our we a certain although we the objects that caused the image, we see in This has a and makes our of photographs representing ficta different from our of with similar If this is as a painting would be to the of the The will perhaps that the is a photograph, but may still strictly it does not depict a it two a and a I take it, is no more than a of the for it the Photographs can only represent their is a but there is no causally to the a particular and a particular are the of the therefore, represents only a particular and a particular this argument is question It that the only way photographs are to represent is by source, by causally to the object they are the represents other object that was not the source, such representation cannot be photographic. In other words, the argument is true only FIP is but this is what is Now, it might be correct to say that photographs have a distinctive way of representing objects that other unlike other there is a sense in which photographs always represent what they are However, this does not that this is the only way by which photographs can depict their or that other ways of representing available to photography are necessarily not may that we the and the as the but and it us to see one, in the that we can as a Now, in order for us to or see a in the we do not need a or a that us what the as is the in the representing in the of we need only to at the image to an of a object visual or can be with a that we may be to call a can be seen in the due to the of some specifically photographic of FIP might still to the particular of and take with the general that I used to the photographic process and that to the of photographic means. may for instance, that while it might be the that some photographs are the such photographs away from the of photography or from the ideal photograph, which is what they are similar and perhaps more of this that the process I the photographic event is one of a more is only a and so does not the essential of there be photographic in a different way, the second and and for instance, or were not one object that what I take to be photographic means are not so they are not essential to In to the a would I to we should that photography is less essential than its and also should be a of such an the is As for the second of the even the were right and the process were only a this would not the of a distinctive photographic process that necessarily these to a photographic image. Moreover, my claim is not that these purported are essential to photography, but when they are they are still part of the of the image more that some something that is indeed essential to photography, the of light and its photosensitive material. As a advocates of FIP may try to claim that their is than I take it to the relevant causal relation of a source with the lens or the photosensitive that they take to photographic means would the of a photosensitive by a of light from a If this were the of would not as a representation of a fictional character by photographic means. to this of FIP would be to what the for such a account my there is no of photography that a view such as that and without a for this of photographic means, it seems to be more than a to FIP. Moreover, the view does not to well with the way we classify and photographs. I the of but the should also other such as and such as a or should not be strictly photographic when the and the are part and of the of photography and its It is also that although this conception of photographic means seems to such as as an of fictional representation by photographic means, it is not clear that it will other by such as for instance, photograph of drawing a One argue that this and a (a fictional and that as they would certainly be photographic in my sense, but the of FIP will not this possibility the that can be seen in the photograph was by a of a photosensitive by a of from a light a It might well be that the has to our and but in the of one should a more open conception of photographic means, one that is in with the way we and classify photographs. I that I have provided this alternative So I have that there is an alternative conception of photographic means that us to say, against that photography is indeed fictionally Currie and Carroll us how photography can represent fictive entities by my arguments are it can also do so by photographic means. that once our conception of photographic means is we can also see how photography can depict not only ficta, but also fictive events by photographic fictive that do not necessarily fictive entities. the photograph in which represents an event that at not as It is therefore a fictive The actual scene to have once before the camera the presence of from the right in with with and this photograph have been by strictly photographic I it The photographer have the light the of in a and other of the the part of the photosensitive in order to the all this before or making the image on the photosensitive If this is photographs can indeed represent not only ficta, but also fictive events by photographic means. Now, we that since certain photographs represent fictive entities or they are fictional or of as to I do not that I have nor does it how a photograph becomes fictional. to this I have that photographs can represent ficta and fictive to what I may be in some representing ficta and fictive events does not a photograph more at than to fictional a or a fictional. Here it is to the that is between the of a work and its or the can be or otherwise) us what the content of the work is, what it is that the work The which is from the in us about the of work it is which it and the function it It is this that to the the relevant that they are to take the It is the and not the that whether a work is fictional or According to the to this matter, a work is fictional it the to or imagine that which is of whether it is a fictional or real or event, while or the to the content of the of its fictional or If this to of literature and there does not to be in to that it should not be for in general and photographic in particular. If this is not all photographs that represent ficta or fictive events are necessarily of fictional not all photographs that represent real entities are necessarily In order for to be fictional or we need to have a relevant function that to the the they should take the for instance, the of a still photograph of the making of a film in which one of the is entirely and in on the pro‐filmic The photograph is as evidence of the and what we see in it is, say, part of the the film was shot and the This photograph a fictional character not strictly by photographic and since its function is to us something about the it is not an of fictional perhaps are the of deceptive photography, such as the image As I have said, this image represents a fictive or event, something that as and its function is to the the is, it is us to that was not at that moment in The will be true of other photographs that represent fictive entities by use or by photographic means, such as in the a photograph that I take while the of a real a on a which I to to a as of the of the a photograph of the this photograph been as I it have by photographic means. as in the of the photograph, the function of these two is to the that what is the fictive was in a particular at a particular given their it is to say that these photographs are even they depict fictive entities or If this is these would be other of photographs that represent ficta are It can be however, that or photographic should only be those that represent what they claim to we are that a photograph a subject or an event, it has to be that event or subject that caused the photograph. deceptive photographic should not be as they more the of to this will a of that I cannot However, try to some I can to my One is that photographic or in the way suggested the are photographic or with the are they in the The with this is that it does not for there works, since only those that are can be but the of photography is with of is that the that photography only makes sense we that its function is to us something about the or is not an of fictional If we are say, the photograph is part of of fictional photography, it would certainly be to it it is not true that there is a from the By to say of a work that it is or is indeed a is the those that what the relevant is not the that the work is photographic. It is true that we to but as we also that photographs can be to various do not the photographic of the image as a it is a photograph and therefore it should be is in the medium that what its correct use should The medium is we the photograph it us to what is we it as If this photograph were as our of it would be very the might not be a what I have in this article. I the on the capacity of photographs to represent ficta. FIP I that we take a more comprehensive view of the nature of photography and a of photographic means, there is no to deny that photographs can represent ficta by photographic means. possible objections to my I that representing fictive entities does not a photograph an of fictional The of fiction and or as they have been are not by the of content of the image. they the the has to take that Finally, I suggested that deceptive photography is understood as photography,