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Focusing on the World Trade Organization (WTO), this paper explores two contrasting risk/uncertainty considerations over a legalized dispute settlement (DS) mechanism: risk reduction and risk creation. One of the incentives for states to establish a legalized DS mechanism is to reduce the risk/uncertainty involved in dispute resolution and to increase the utility of dispute outcomes. Due to the four features of the legalized DS system clear substantive rules, well-established procedural rules, independent legal bodies, and legal precedents the legalized DS system tends to produce dispute outcomes with narrower variations and smaller fluctuations, as compared with the non-legal bargaining DS system. On the other hand, the legalized DS system also creates risk resulting from the independence of the legal institutions. Because states are concerned that the actual dispute outcomes made by the independent legal bodies may deviate from their expectations at the time of the original legalization agreement, they try to limit the authority of the legal bodies by using various measures.
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Don Moon (2004) studied this question.
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