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This article examines how presidential non-divestment can generate systemic corruption even in well-established democracies. Focusing on President Donald Trump’s second term, it argues that the continued ownership of a global business empire while exercising executive authority has produced persistent conflicts of interest. My analysis synthesizes publicly reported cases—including foreign business dealings, trade and regulatory decisions, monetization of travel, and politicized uses of executive discretion – to illustrate how non-divestment alters incentives for domestic and foreign actors seeking access or favor. The commentary reframes these developments as evidence of institutional vulnerability rather than episodic misconduct. The core contribution is to demonstrate how reliance on informal norms of presidential self-restraint can enable systemic corruption, even in the absence of provable quid pro quo exchange, thereby undermining democratic accountability and public trust.
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Lynn Rees (2026) studied this question.
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