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Blockchain technology proffers innovative solutions to address trust-related concerns in enterprise operations. We delve into the operations of two manufacturers engaged in selling a marginal-intensive green product (MIGP) and a development-intensive green product (DIGP). Each manufacturer determines the level of product greenness level, derived from the product’s distinctive environmental attributes, and sets the price accordingly. In this pursuit, we examine four distinct scenarios in total: non-adoption, adoption by one of the manufacturer, and the concurrent adoption by two manufacturers. The results support the subsequent arguments. First, the simultaneous adoption of blockchain by both manufacturers does not consistently foster perpetual improvement in the environmental standards of products, especially concerning the easily discernible DIGP. Second, escalated market competition empowers both MIGP and DIGP manufacturers to attain pricing advantages and market through the unilateral adoption of blockchain. Finally, the decision for both competing manufacturers to adopt blockchain hinges upon adoption costs, the intensity of price competition, and the underlying cost structures of their respective products. Notably, the cost investment coefficient pertaining to MIGP and DIGP emerges as a pivotal determinant that significantly influences the range of applicable equilibrium strategies.
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Jiang et al. (2025) studied this question.
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