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As the internet becomes central to social interactions, the risks associated with cyber-propaganda continue to grow. In the context of this article, I discuss cyber – propaganda as state – directed messaging distributed over digital networks to manipulate public perception or influence decision – making across borders. Such propaganda often creates animosities between peoples and results in varying degrees of harm. This article advances discussions on cyber-propaganda de-escalation by drawing insights from historical disarmament processes. It introduces a taxonomy that distinguishes between infrastructural and operational components of disarmament and de-escalation processes and explores the critical roles trust and fear have played in the past. Reframing cyber-propaganda as a shared global challenge, this article argues that collaborative and incremental progress is needed to address the growing weaponization of the internet. The article calls for further policy research on two tracks: informational de-escalation focused on eliminating negative national stereotypes from AI training sets, and infrastructural de-escalation exploring how antitrust regulations and interoperability measures might tackle concentrated corporate power and reduce the reach of cyber-propaganda operations.
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Juan Ortiz-Freuler (2026) studied this question.
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