In this paper, we propose a robust and efficient signature scheme for vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, called binary authentication tree (BAT). The BAT scheme can effectively eliminate the performance bottleneck when verifying a mass of signatures within a rigorously required interval, even under adverse scenarios with bogus messages. Given any n received messages with k ges 1 bogus ones, the computation cost to verify all these messages only requires approximately (k + 1) ldr log(n/k) + 4k - 2 time-consuming pairing operations. The BAT scheme can also be gracefully transplanted to other similar batch signature schemes. In addition, it offers the other conventional security for vehicular networks, such as identity privacy and traceability. Theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrate the validity and practicality of the BAT scheme.
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Jiang et al. (2008) studied this question.
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