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The development of Chinese-Russian relations in the Arctic affects international security architecture. 2014 and 2022 are identified as critical moments in this analysis, reflecting the subsequent stages of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the systematically activated international sanctions. Focusing on the Arctic as a contested laboratory of great-power rivalry, this study examines Sino-Russian military cooperation. Two main questions are discussed: which determinants have reoriented Beijing’s and Moscow’s approaches to joint military action, and what is the scope and extent of those actions? Using a multi-source qualitative approach, the author traces the post-2014 and especially post-2022 shifts, linking sanctions pressure and resource/logistics imperatives to a measurable surge in joint exercises, patrols, and command-and-control familiarization. Furthermore, this article's discussion includes Chinese-Russian anti-US balancing, Russia’s sanctions-induced dependence on Chinese finance and technology, and divergent governance preferences based on the Russian sovereign approach to the Northern Sea Route versus China’s Polar Silk Road narrative.
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Michał Piechowicz (2025) studied this question.
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