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This paper explores information sharing strategies in a closed-loop supply chain comprising a manufacturer (denoted as ‘he’) and a retailer (denoted as ‘she’) with dual sales channels and dual recycling channels. By considering the manufacturer’s varying attitudes towards different markets under dual information asymmetry between sales market demand and recycling market demand, we construct and utilise a game-theoretic model to determine the optimal strategy of information sharing for the retailer (i.e. no sharing, sharing solely sales information, sharing only recycling information, sharing sales and recycling information). Interestingly, we find that the retailer’s sharing of information does not invariably result in diminished profits, whereas the manufacturer’s acquisition of information does not always lead to enhanced profits, which is related to the manufacturer’s attitude towards the market. Specifically, when the manufacturer is conservative regarding market potential, accurate market information is required to enhance his pricing confidence. Conversely, when the manufacturer perceives the market potential to be considerable, he tends to refrain from acquiring market information.
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Cao et al. (2025) studied this question.
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