Conceptual distinction explains how relational obligations differ from nonrelational ones, emphasizing wronging others.
There is a straightforward conceptual distinction between “relational” and “nonrelational” obligations (obligations that are not conceived in explicitly relational terms). 1 Unlike nonrelational obligations, it is intrinsic to relational obligations that they are owed to others. In addition to the person subject to the obligation, the obligor , there is also an obligee (or obligees) to whom the obligation is owed. With nonrelational obligations, there need only be an obligor; no obligee is required. Similarly, when a nonrelational obligation is violated, something wrong has been done. When, however, the violated obligation is relational, not only is a ( pro tanto ) wrong done, someone to whom the obligation is owed is wronged.
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Stephen Darwall (2026) studied this question.
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