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Sirs, Just recently I received the September 1997 issue 3 (9) of TM&IH. Working and living in Nigeria for some years, I read with more than usual interest the article by Shakoor et al. (1997) on ‘Assessment of the incidence of substandard drugs in developing countries’. Some of their conclusions deserve comment. Although the criteria for selection of drugs for the samples seem relevant (high use or high cost), this selection resulted in an extremely limited range of drugs (just chloroquine and four antibiotics, three of which were broad-spectrum). Therefore the conclusions certainly may not be generalized to all drugs. Their conclusions on analysis of the samples and the manufacturing of the drugs seem valid. However, there is a bold statement in the summary (at which most readers will glimpse) that there was ‘little evidence to indicate fraudulent manufacturing.’ This can be challenged. Firstly the authors consider the finding that at least 6% of the samples contained no active ingredient is not counterfeiting. This is amazing. How many of the samples showed active ingredients below the standard? How many above standard? I guess dilution was more common than exceeding the pharmacopoeial limits. Secondly, they admit that the methods they used cannot even identify the difference between poor manufacturing and counterfeiting. So why play the issue down? For instance, they write that all samples were within their expiry date. But the printed expiry date is certainly no proof, since making ‘labels-which-look-appropriate’ has become an art in Nigeria! Thirdly, the authors state that there was no additional evidence to confirm criminal activities. But that is not true, since they mention the production of coloured, embossed tablets containing no active ingredient. With a target population of more than one hundred million people in Nigeria, counterfeiters indeed can afford to make big efforts to conceal their crime and continue their big business. Could the authors have checked more? An example: In 1996 we bought for a considerable price from one supplier 100 tins of 5 mg prednisolone in three different batches. Prednisolone is used a/o. to treat immune reactions in leprosy patients. Before distribution to the projects, we had them checked. Two samples had labels from British firms, one from Nigeria. One British firm mentioned on the label was found to be non-existent, the other one has not delivered any drugs to Nigeria for some years. We have not been in a position to trace the Nigerian company. The samples were analysed in the Netherlands by IDA. All three samples contained prednisolone, but precisely between 15% to 18% of the indicated amount! This is certainly counterfeiting! While we were facing severe problems with importation of genuine prednisolone, we had to use the tablets as 1 mg tablets, forcing some patients to take a daily handful (sixty tablets) of prednisolone for breakfast. This anecdotal information shows at least that counterfeiting occurs, not just the making of substandard drugs. Treatment failure and permanent nerve damage could have been the result. The general public should be protected against these bad practices and there is a great need for the establishment of adequate quality control mechanisms. To safeguard such institutions for quality control from corrupt practices, close international collaboration between industrialized and developing countries would seem the most logical way to improve.
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Verduin‐Muttiganzi et al. (1998) studied this question.
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