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When it launches in 2017, China's CO2 emissions trading system (ETS) will be the first to be implemented in a developing country and will cover the largest CO2 emissions volume of any system to date. We evaluate the potential of an ETS to alter the emitting behavior of covered firms and support the achievement of national CO2 intensity reduction targets at least cost. Specifically, we focus on two questions: 1) what factors have limited firms' past compliance with environmental policy in China, and 2) what can be done to strengthen compliance with China's national ETS? We argue that altering firm behavior will require strong institutions-in particular, a strong legal foundation for the system, a nationally unified set of monitoring and reporting requirements subject to independent third-party verification, and ongoing broader economic reforms to remove barriers to system operation. It will also require signaling a sustained commitment to experimentation, evaluation, and modification of the system based on performance, because system effectiveness will depend on expectations about its longevity and credibility, but will inevitably require adjustments. We illustrate the importance of these recommendations for firm compliance behavior by drawing on experience from the Beijing pilot ETS (2013)(2014)(2015). Given vast heterogeneity across provinces, specific attention should be given to strengthening institutional foundations where they are least developed alongside the construction of a national ETS.
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Karplus et al. (2017) studied this question.
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