Parity, Interval Value, and Choice

In "The Possibility of Parity," I argued that the right thing to say about certain hard cases of comparison-cases in which one item is better in some relevant respects, while the other is better in other relevant respects, but there is no obvious truth about how the items compare in all relevant respects-is that the items are 'on a~ par'.' 'Parity', I said, is a fourth "positive' value relation of independent standing, not subsumable under the familiar trichotomny of relations 'better than', 'worse than', and 'equally good'. My argument took the' fonrm of an argument by elimination: the cases of interest are not cases of ignorance, in which one of the traditional three relations holds but we don't know which, nor cases of vagueness, in which the items occupy the borderline of one of the traditional three relations but are cases of determinate comparability; therefore, as cases of determinate comparability in which none of the traditional three relations holds, they must be cases in which a fourth relation of comparability holds-they are on a par.