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Unitary states often appoint outsiders to govern localities as a means of ensuring central control. China’s central government since dynastic times has followed this logic, implementing regulations preventing officials from leading their home localities and rotation policies that limit tenures within single locations. In recent decades, the Chinese party-state’s rationale for cadre rotation has evolved beyond control to also serve broader goals of grooming cadres to maximize national development and diffusing developmental ideas and processes to maximize local development. These three logics of cadre rotation reflect different—and often contradictory—governance priorities. I argue that underlying logics of cadre rotation can be discerned from an analysis of cadre work backgrounds and destination characteristics. I then introduce a unique county-level biographical database covering 7,039 unique county party secretaries to test hypotheses regarding the relative frequency of different rotation logics during the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. The analysis shows how governance priorities shifted away from central control and towards grooming and diffusion under Hu, but have since de-emphasized diffusion under Xi while re-emphasizing control. These results provide a deeper understanding of cadre management and local governance priorities under Xi, and contribute to the literature on central-local tensions in unitary states.
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David J. Bulman (2025) studied this question.
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