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I argue that a naturalistic form of dualism has potential for helping us account for singular reference and intentionality. Quinean naturalism does not entail physicalism, nor vice versa, so naturalistic dualism is coherent. Whether naturalistic dualism or naturalistic physicalism is preferable is decided based on our best interpretations of our current best theory or theories of science and whether any of them quantify over non-physical entities, that is, entities not talked about by the science of physics. Psychology’s reliance on first-personal theoretical statements suggests dualism since its logical form is richer than that of physics, which has an entirely impersonal logical form. First-personal statements are also useful to discern structurally indiscernible referents, and therefore may form the germ of a solution to Putnam’s Paradox.
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Frederique Janssen‐Lauret (2024) studied this question.
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