Explores structural arguments in representation, uncovering the demands of underlying structure and implications for consciousness.
Two published papers on representation; "The Representational Asymmetry: One Structure Across Gödel, Turing, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness" 10.5281/zenodo.21739283 and "Original but Not Intrinsic: The Nature of Representational Content" 10.5281/zenodo.21739393, call their central arguments structural, and rest their conclusions on the word. But a structural argument owes an account of what structure, and neither supplies one. Neither could: each was confined to a region it could anchor externally. This paper pays the debt. It collects five commitments the two papers state outright, treats them as demands on any structure that could satisfy both, and derives what those demands force. The answer is a non-orientable surface, minimally a Möbius band. Two results argued separately, on unrelated anchors, then turn out to interlock, because they press toward non-orientability from opposite sides. And the self-similar regress both papers report, which neither can attribute to anything, is what a global obstruction looks like to a local inspection.
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William Ekeson (2026) studied this question.
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