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We often ascribe beliefs to groups, institutions, companies, and similar social entities, and many philosophers inquire into the nature of such beliefs. While different accounts have been proposed, many agree that group belief should be analysed in terms of the behaviour and the attitudes of the group’s members. In this paper, I raise a principled worry against such individualistic accounts of group belief. The basic concern is that individualistic accounts of group belief cannot be squared with existing accounts of the nature of belief from the philosophy of mind, such as dispositionalism and functionalism. My focus will be on group belief, but parallel concerns can be raised for individualistic accounts of group justified belief, group knowledge, and group assertion.
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Alexander Dinges (2026) studied this question.
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