Whereas the first paper of this series compared the work of five theorists of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis, this paper compares three theorists of intersubjectivity in infant research, Andrew Meltzoff, Colwyn Trevarthen, and Daniel Stern. By evaluating the points at which the theorists concur and differ, we hope to clarify the meanings or “forms” of intersubjectivity in infancy. All three have addressed the question of how infants can sense the state of the other, and all have used the concept of cross-modal correspondences as a central aspect of the answer. Nevertheless each has a distinctly different theory of intersubjectivity in infancy.
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Beebe et al. (2003) studied this question.
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