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Despite the abundance of recent studies on divided government, no clear consensus has emerged as to whether divided partisan control has an appreciable impact on policy outcomes. In this article we take a new perspective on the divided government debate by emphasizing the important role that the federal bureaucracy plays in shaping policy. We present a game theoretic model of the policy-making process in which legislators design administrative procedures, the president appoints agency heads, and bureaucrats collect information and promulgate regulations. The model predicts that during times of divided control Congress delegates less discretionary authority to the executive branch, and that these changes in authority have significant policy consequences. We then test the implications of our model with data drawn from U.S. trade policy between 1890 and 1990. Our central finding is that divided government influences policy indirectly, through the procedures that Congress designs to control the bureaucracy.
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Epstein et al. (1996) studied this question.
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