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This paper uses game theory to analyse the effects of factoring on a two-echelon supply chain, involving a capital-constrained supplier and a retailer. It explores the roles of buyback and bargaining in profit allocation, utilising a Stackelberg game model and numerical simulations. Findings show that buyback significantly influences the supplier’s bargaining strategies; without buyback, suppliers are less likely to negotiate, although retailers might adjust wholesale prices if suppliers’ power is weak. When buyback is included, suppliers with low bargaining power are more inclined to negotiate prices. Moreover, in the absence of bargaining, a high buy-back price is preferred if the supplier expects a significant profit share. This study enhances understanding of factoring and bargaining theory, offering managerial insights. It reveals that the loan-to-value ratio and supplier bargaining power critically affect decision-making and profit distribution, suggesting that a high loan-to-value ratio can be beneficial when suppliers anticipate low profits, and that negotiations should focus on wholesale rather than buy-back prices.
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Zhao et al. (2025) studied this question.
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