Representation as intervention: A reply to Unal, Polillo, Caliskan, and MacKenzie

In their article ‘The modes of performativity’, Unal et al. (2025) argue that the concept of ‘representational interventions’ provides a basis for a meta-theoretical framework through which to understand the performativity literature. Building on a previously published article of my own, this reply briefly outlines three critiques of their contribution. First, given the already existing paradigm of ‘representation as intervention’ (Curran, 2018), I raise questions about the novelty of framing performativity as ‘representational interventions’. Second, while acknowledging the importance of meta-theoretical work, I raise critical questions about the framing of their approach as a heuristic that can accommodate all existing approaches to performativity, suggesting that it is rather a substantive account of performativity with significant ontological presuppositions. Lastly, my reply focuses on inadequacies in their account of performativity as ‘representational interventions’. Specifically, I question their neglect of aboutness, intentionality, and the distinctiveness of agency and reflexivity in conscious animals with ways of experiencing the world. I conclude by arguing for my ‘representation as intervention’ as an alternative approach that avoids these limitations.