Toward intentionism: a fourth metatheoretical perspective on information science and documentation

Purpose This paper proposes intentionism as a fourth metatheoretical perspective for information science and documentation, addressing a theoretical gap revealed by the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) as a primary mediator of information creation, curation and provision. Existing metatheories, specifically constructivism, collectivism and constructionism, do not adequately account for the intent-laden, formative force that shapes information before and during its production, a dimension now structurally consequential in AI-mediated environments. Design/methodology/approach The paper adopts a theoretical and conceptual approach, drawing on Buckland's (1991) typology of information as ontological grounding and Bates' (2006) neurobiological framework as a biological-cognitive bridge. It reviews the three dominant LIS metatheories to identify what remains theoretically unaddressed, then develops intentionism as a metatheoretical response, with particular attention to AI-generated and AI-mediated information. Findings Intentionism foregrounds intent and context as constitutive dimensions of information, identifying the “Information Act” as a distinct analytical object theorising the formative moment between neural–cultural formation and exosomatic expression. Intentionism complements rather than displaces existing metatheories, responding to conditions in which large language models, recommendation algorithms and generative systems embed intent structurally, making questions of provenance and epistemic effect central to LIS theory and practice. Originality/value This paper conceptualises intentionism as an LIS metatheory to place intent at its theoretical centre, introducing the Information Act as a new analytical category and extending foundational work by Buckland and Bates in a direction not previously theorised within LIS metatheory.