Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The degradation of product quality is one form of rent dissipation resulting from incomplete property rights in fisheries. Industry structure and information asymmetries can also lead to underinvestment in product quality, even when property rights are well defined. In this article we empirically examine whether the voluntary formation of a marketing cooperative was able to mitigate market failures that led to the production of inferior‐quality fish. Specifically, we use a difference‐in‐differences estimation strategy to measure the impact that the Copper River Fishermen's Cooperative, an Alaskan salmon marketing cooperative, had on ex‐vessel salmon prices and salmon quality measures. We find that the cooperative was able to improve product quality, as well as attract and sustain a higher price for its salmon. Our findings provide empirical support for many of the key tenets of cooperative theory. Specifically, we find evidence that marketing cooperatives can address existing market failures, that marketing cooperatives can have advantages in high‐quality product markets, and that over time, as a result of their success, marketing cooperatives may lead to lasting producer benefits even though they become obsolete due to nonmember free‐riding.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jardine et al. (2014) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: