Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This study examines whether risk-taking incentives of non-CEO members of the top management team (TMT) are associated with firms' innovation disclosure and subsequent innovation outcomes. We measure incremental non-CEO TMT risk-taking incentives as the component of non-CEO TMT Vega not predicted by contemporaneous CEO Vega. Using U.S. public firms from 2005 to 2024, we find that stronger incremental non-CEO TMT incentives are associated with more extensive, forward-looking, and specific innovation disclosure and with stronger subsequent patent-based innovation outcomes. The incentive–disclosure relation is generally more pronounced under greater product-market competition and institutional monitoring. Further analyses show that the relation is strongest when contemporaneous innovation performance is weak and that stronger incentives are associated with greater divergence between disclosure and contemporaneous patent outcomes in both directions. Post-filing market outcomes associated with innovation disclosure also vary with non-CEO TMT incentives, including greater trading activity, idiosyncratic volatility, and lower illiquidity. Overall, the evidence highlights the importance of broader TMT incentive structures for understanding both innovation communication and subsequent innovation activity beyond CEO incentives.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jin et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: